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Abstract 
In order to aid manufacturers, component personalisers, certification authorities and 
other Digital Tachograph stakeholders with the development and testing of equipment 
and systems complying with the Generation-2 Smart Tachograph specifications, a 
comprehensive set of Generation-2 sample cryptographic keys and digital certificates has 
been developed. 
This document serves to detail the contents of this sample set and the values chosen for 
individual fields in the certificates. It also explains which kind of tests can be done using 
the cryptographic material in the set, as well as identifying some tests that cannot be 
done with this set. 
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1 Introduction 
The digital tachograph system (Generation-1 Digital Tachograph) has been introduced by 
Council Regulation 3821/85 as amended by Council Regulation 2135/98 [1] and 
Commission Regulation 1360/2002 [2]. Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 [3] and its 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 [4] call for the introduction of a 
Generation-2 Smart Tachograph.  
 
Annex 1C (Requirements for construction, testing, installation, and inspection) to [4] 
includes the technical specifications of the Smart Tachograph system. Detailed technical 
information is contained in a series of sixteen appendices to Annex 1C. Appendix 11 
(Common Security Mechanisms) describes all details of the cryptographic security 
mechanism used to protect the data stored and transmitted in the Smart Tachograph 
system.  
1.1 Scope of this document 
Security mechanisms have been defined to secure the exchange and storage of data by 
the Smart Tachograph equipment, namely Vehicle Units, Tachograph Cards, Motion 
Sensors and External GNSS Facilities. Such mechanisms are mainly based on 
cryptographic solutions. Specifically, a cryptographic infrastructure has been defined, 
with symmetric keys, asymmetric keys and digital certificates stored in the Smart 
Tachograph equipment, allowing the execution of cryptographic algorithms and protocols. 
Section 2.1 below gives an overview of the cryptographic infrastructure of the Smart 
Tachograph. In order to support Member State Certification Authorities (MSCAs), 
manufacturers, component personalisers and other stakeholders with the development 
and testing of equipment and systems complying with these new specifications, a 
comprehensive set of Generation-2 sample keys and certificates has been developed. 
 
This document serves to detail the contents of this sample set and the values chosen for 
individual fields in the certificates. It also explains which kind of tests can be done using 
the cryptographic material in the set, as well as identifying some tests that cannot be 
done with this set. 
 
Please note that most of the Generation-2 equipment must also contain Generation-1 
cryptographic keys and digital certificates, in order to be able to communicate to 
Generation-1 equipment. However, for these keys and certificates stakeholders may 
adapt cryptographic test material developed or made available in the past. The sample 
set described in this document contains only Generation-2 keys and certificates. 
1.2 Intended audience 
This document accompanies the sample set of Generation-2 keys and certificates. It is 
intended for stakeholders involved in the development of devices and systems for the 
Smart Tachograph system. Readers of this document should be familiar with the contents 
of Annex 1C, and especially with Appendix 11 to that Annex.  
1.3 Disclaimer 
This sample set has to be only seen as a support to the development and testing 
processes of digital tachograph stakeholders. In the event of any conflict between the 
contents of the sample set and the Implementing Regulation 2016/799 [4] and its 
Annexes and Appendices, the latter shall prevail. Each stakeholder remains fully 
responsible for making sure that their equipment complies with all requirements in [4]. 
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2 Smart Tachograph security mechanisms 
Figure 1 shows an overview of the Smart Tachograph system. 
 
Figure 1 Overview of the Smart Tachograph system 
The vehicle unit (VU) is the central component of the system. Every vehicle is equipped 
with a vehicle unit whose main task is to log driving activities.  
 
In order to do so, each vehicle unit is securely paired to a motion sensor (MS), which is 
connected to the gearbox of the vehicle and provides the vehicle unit with a signal that 
represents the vehicle’s speed. During pairing, which is done once by a workshop, the VU 
and the motion sensor mutually authenticate each other. After this, part of the 
communication between a VU and a motion sensor is authenticated and encrypted.  
 
Users of a vehicle unit are equipped with a tachograph card (TC). There are four types of 
cards, corresponding to the four roles of Driver, Control Officer, Workshop or Company. 
Upon insertion of a card in a VU, the card and the VU mutually authenticate each other. 
Subsequently, communication between them is authenticated and in some cases 
encrypted. Moreover, once the VU is authenticated to the card, it is allowed to write data 
to some of the data structures on the card. In addition, the exact working mode of a VU 
is determined by the card(s) that is/are inserted into its card slots. 
 
The vehicle unit is also able to periodically log the vehicle’s position and check the 
plausibility of the motion sensor’s signal by means of position determination based on a 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). The GNSS receiver that is necessary to do so 
is either contained in the VU itself, or in an External GNSS Facility (EGF). In case an EGF 
is used, the vehicle is securely coupled once to the VU by a workshop. During coupling, 
the VU and EGF authenticate each other. Afterwards, communication between them is 
authenticated. 
 
The data stored on either a vehicle unit or a card must be downloaded by a control officer 
during a check or by the responsible company. Although the communication interfaces 
used for downloading data from a card or from a VU are rather different, the security 
requirements on both interfaces are equal: the integrity, authenticity and non-
repudiation of the downloaded data must be protected by means of a digital signature 
created by the VU or the card. 
 
Finally, the Smart Tachograph system also contains Remote Early Detection 
Communication Readers (REDCRs). These are readers that are operated by a control 
officer and are positioned along the roadside or on officers’ vehicles. They are capable of 
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interrogating a Remote Communication Facility (RCF) in a passing vehicle over a DSRC 
link, without having to stop the vehicle. The VU periodically stores relevant data, in 
particular driving and control data, in the RCF. Such a system allows for a frequent 
verification of the vehicle status through remote interrogations. The data communicated 
over the DSRC link is encrypted and authenticated by the VU before it is sent to the RCF. 
2.1 Smart Tachograph cryptographic infrastructure 
In order to fulfil the security requirements for each of the interactions outlined above, the 
vehicle unit, tachograph cards, motion sensor and EGF all contain a number of 
cryptographic elements, namely public/private key pairs, digital certificates and/or 
symmetric keys. They comply with Appendix 11 of Annex 1C, which also gives a full 
specification of the protocols adopted to secure the interaction of the different system 
components.  
Public/private key pairs are based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), symmetric keys 
are based on the AES algorithm, whereas as hash algorithm SHA-2 has been adopted. 
A number of pre-defined key lengths and hash sizes have been specified and combined 
together to form cipher suites, which assure a consistent level of security for all 
interactions of the Smart Tachograph components. The cipher suites are summarized in 
Table 1. All system components mentioned above must support all cipher suites. 
 
Cipher 
suite 
ECC key size 
(bits) 
AES key 
length (bits) 
Hashing 
algorithm 
CS#1 256 128 SHA-256 
CS#2 384 192 SHA-384 
CS#3 512/521 256 SHA-512 
Table 1 Cipher suites defined for the Smart Tachograph system 
 
For Elliptic Curve Cryptography there is the need to choose domain parameters. Appendix 
11 of Annex 1C allows two sets of standardized domain parameters, the NIST and 
Brainpool domain parameters. Both for the NIST and the Brainpool standard a set of 
domain parameters for each of the key sizes specified in Table 1 has been selected. The 
complete set is shown in Table 2. 
 
Name Key size (bits) 
NIST P-256 256 
BrainpoolP256r1 256 
NIST P-384 384 
BrainpoolP384r1 384 
BrainpoolP512r1 512 
NIST P-521 521 
Table 2 Allowed standardized domain parameters for ECC 
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A cryptographic infrastructure has been designed for the generation and deployment of 
the cryptographic elements in the Smart Tachograph system. It is made of three layers, 
a European level, a member state level and a system component level. Such an 
infrastructure acts both as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and as symmetric keys 
distribution infrastructure. 
2.1.1 Asymmetric keys and Public Key Infrastructure 
The ECC key pairs are part of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), as shown in Figure 2. 
This Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) consists of three levels. From top to bottom, these 
are:  
 the European level, managed by the European Root Certificate Authority (ERCA).  
 the Member State level, managed by the Member State Certificate Authority 
(MSCA) of every member state involved in the digital tachograph system.  
 The equipment level, managed by the manufacturers or personalizers of vehicle 
units, tachograph cards and EGFs. 
 
 
Figure 2 Smart Tachograph PKI 
 
On the European level, the ERCA creates a single ECC key pair that serves as the root 
key pair of the entire PKI. The ERCA also creates a self-signed root certificate containing 
the root public key. ERCA certificates have a validity period of 34 years and 3 months. 
The ERCA root key pair and certificate are renewed over time (see next section). The 
ERCA uses the corresponding private key to sign MSCA certificates. The public MSCA 
keys to be signed are sent to the ERCA by the MSCAs. 
 
On the Member State level, each MSCA that needs to issue certificates for VUs or EGFs 
creates a key pair, which is indicated in Appendix 11 as MSCA_VU-EGF. Then it requests 
the ERCA to sign a certificate for the respective public key. Similarly, each MSCA that 
needs to issue certificates for tachograph cards creates an MSCA_Card key pair and asks 
the ERCA to sign the corresponding certificate. MSCA_VU-EGF certificates are valid for 17 
years and 3 months. MSCA_Card certificates have a validity period of 7 years and 1 
month. The MSCA uses the corresponding private keys to sign equipment certificates. 
 
ERCA 
Root
Cert.
MSCA_VU
Cert.
VU_Sign
Cert.
VU_MA
Cert.
MSCA_Card
Cert.
Card_Sign
Cert.
Card_MA
Cert. 
MSCA_VU-
EGF
Cert.
MSCA_Card
Cert.
MSCA_Card
Cert.
MSCA_Card
Cert.
EGF_MA
Cert.
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On the equipment level, the manufacturer or personaliser of each VU, card or EGF1 
creates at least an equipment key pair for mutual authentication. The component will use 
this key pair to authenticate itself to other equipment it will interoperate with during its 
lifetime. In addition, for a VU, a workshop card or a driver card, the manufacturer or 
personaliser also creates a key pair for signing. These components will use their signing 
private key to sign data that is downloaded from them. Other component types are not 
required to support data downloads and hence do not need a signing key pair. All 
generated public keys are sent to the competent MSCA for the generation of the 
respective certificate. The validity period of equipment certificates is as follows: 
 VU_Sign   15 years and 3 months 
 VU_MA   15 years and 3 months 
 Driver Card_Sign:  5 years and 1 month 
 Workshop Card_Sign: 1 year and 1 month 
 Driver Card_MA:   5 years 
 Company Card_MA: 5 years 
 Control Card_MA: 2 years 
 Workshop Card_MA: 1 year 
 EGF_MA   15 years   
 
All certificates issued within the Smart Tachograph system are so-called card-verifiable 
certificates. Their format is equal for all types of certificates and is show in the table 
below: 
Field Tag 
Length 
(bytes) 
ASN.1 data type 
(see Appendix 1 of 
Regulation (EU) 
2016/799 [4]) 
ECC Certificate ‘7F 21’ var  
 ECC Certificate Body ‘7F 4E’ var  
 Certificate Profile Identifier ‘5F 29’ ‘01’ INTEGER(0..255) 
 Certificate Authority Reference ‘42’ ‘08’ KeyIdentifier 
 Certificate Holder Authorisation ‘5F 4C’ ‘07’ CertificateHolder
Authorisation 
 Public Key ‘7F 49’ var  
  Domain Parameters ‘06’ var OBJECT IDENTIFIER 
  Public Point ‘86’ var OCTET STRING 
 Certificate Holder Reference ‘5F 20’ ‘08’ KeyIdentifier 
 Certificate Effective Date ‘5F 25’ ‘04’ TimeReal 
 Certificate Expiration Date ‘5F 24’ ‘04’ TimeReal 
 ECC Certificate Signature ‘5F 37’ var OCTET STRING 
Table 3 Smart Tachograph certificate format 
                                           
1
 Note that motion sensors do not contain asymmetric keys or certificates. 
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2.1.2 Symmetric keys 
Concerning symmetric keys in the Smart Tachograph system, there are two kinds of keys 
managed in the cryptographic infrastructure: 
 Keys for protecting the communication between a VU and a Motion Sensor: 
o Motion Sensor Master Keys. These are constituted from a Workshop Card 
Master Key part and a VU Master Key part.  
o Identification Keys, which are derived from the Motion Sensor Master Keys 
and a constant vector. 
 Keys for protecting the communication over a DSRC link between a VU and a 
Remote Early Detection Communication Reader: 
o DSRC Master Keys 
o VU-specific DSRC keys for encryption and authentication, derived from a 
DSRC Master Key 
The motion sensor keys are used to secure the link between VU and Motion Sensor. The 
DSRC keys are used to secure the data uploaded on the Remote Communication Facility.  
The Motion Sensor Master Key, along with its constituting parts, and the DSRC Master 
Key are generated by the ERCA. Every time the ERCA replaces the ERCA root key pair, it 
also replaces the Master Keys (see next section). The Master Keys are provided by the 
ERCA to the MSCAs. A MSCA can use the Motion Sensor Master Keys to generate specific 
cryptographic material to be installed in a Motion Sensor. A MSCA can also provide the 
Workshop Card Master Key part to be installed in Workshop cards, or can provide the VU 
Master Key part to be installed in VUs according to Appendix 11 of Annex 1C. A MSCA 
can use the DSRC Master Keys to generate the VU-specific DSRC keys for a VU. A MSCA 
can also provide the DSRC Master Keys to be installed in Control and Workshop card 
according to Appendix 11 of Annex 1C. Each generation of these Master Keys will be in 
use by Smart Tachograph component for 34 years. 
2.2 ERCA keys replacement and link certificates 
Appendix 11 of Annex 1C describes a mechanism that ERCA can use to replace the root 
key pair and respective certificate, along with the associated master keys. The appendix 
also specifies that such a replacement shall take place every 17 years.  
An important advantage of this key replacement is that it gives ERCA a chance to review 
whether the security level of the root key pair and associated master keys is still 
sufficient. If this is not the case, ERCA can decide to switch to longer key lengths. 
Whenever ERCA creates a new root key pair, the following actions take place:  
 In order to ensure interaction between equipment issued under different 
generations of the root key, ERCA will issue a so-called link certificate. A link 
certificate contains the new ERCA public key and is signed with the previous ERCA 
private key. By verifying the link certificate, equipment issued under the previous 
ERCA key pair is able to trust the new ERCA public key and so it is allowed to 
interact with equipment issued under the new ERCA public key. See Appendix 11 
of Annex 1C for more details. 
 ERCA also generates a new Motion Sensor Master Key, and relative parts, and a 
new DSRC Master Key. For the concerned equipment all master keys, and related 
materials, that are valid at the time of its issuance have to be installed in its 
memory. This ensures the interaction between equipment linked to different 
master key generation. See Appendix 11 of Annex 1C for more details. 
2.3 Goal of the sample set 
All stakeholders should develop and implement the security mechanisms relevant to 
them and should be able to test their implementation. The sample set of keys and 
certificates was developed with this need in mind. In particular, the sample set allows: 
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 Testing the use of the AES, SHA-2 and ECC algorithms, using all specified key 
lengths and standardized domain parameters. 
 Testing the use of all types of key pairs / certificates (i.e. on ERCA, MSCA and 
Equipment level) and all types of symmetric keys (i.e. DSRC and Motion Sensor 
keys) defined in Appendix 11 of Annex 1C. 
 Testing of the correct implementation of the link certificate mechanism specified in 
Appendix 11.  
 Testing of the mechanisms to manage the replacement of the DSRC Master Key 
and Motion Sensor Master Key with new ones. 
 Testing of the correct handling of certificate validity periods. 
More details are given in chapter 6. 
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3 Contents of the sample set 
This chapter describes the contents of the sample set, i.e. the keys and certificates that 
are present. The chapter also discusses the reasoning behind the selection of these keys 
and certificates and the relation between them. 
 
Section 3.1 describes the asymmetric key pairs and certificates present in the sample set 
in more detail. Section 3.2 describes the symmetric keys and related encrypted data. 
3.1 Asymmetric key pairs and certificates 
The overall logic behind the asymmetric cryptographic material in the sample set is the 
following: 
1. Three generations of ERCA root certificates have been defined, with an 
increasing key size. Two link certificates linking these certificates have been 
provided. 
2. Two countries have been defined, indicated as UTO (for Utopia) and ARC (for 
Arcadia). For both countries, there is an MSCA responsible for issuing card 
certificates (MSCA_Card) and an MSCA for issuing VU and EGF certificates 
(MSCA_VU-EGF).  
3. On the equipment level, a VU is issued under every MSCA_VU-EGF certificate 
and a full set of tachograph cards is issued under every MSCA_Card certificate. 
Also, an EGF is issued under every MSCA_VU-EGF certificate. This implies that 
the sample set contains certificates for VUs, EGFs and sets of cards for both 
Utopia and Arcadia. 
 
Figure 3 below shows the certificates that are present in the sample set. Notes to the 
figure: 
 Different generations of the root certificate are indicated by a number in brackets. 
E.g. ERCA (1) is the first generation of ERCA root certificate; ERCA (2) is the 
second generation, etc. 
 Other certificates are indicated by two numbers in brackets, the first one 
indicating the root certificate generation under which they are issued, the second 
one the sequence number of the certificate itself. E.g. MSCA_Card (1-1) is the 
first MSCA_Card certificate issued under ERCA (1); MSCA_Card (2-1) is the first 
MSCA_Card certificate issued under ERCA (2); Card_MA(2-1) is the first Card 
certificate for mutual authentication that is issued under ERCA (2), etc. 
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Figure 3 Asymmetric keys and certificates in the sample set 
 
The following assumptions have also been made: 
1. The set contains a number of European root key pairs and certificates, as 
described in section 9.1.2 of Appendix 11. It has been decided that at the 
ERCA level the root keys are based only on Brainpool curves. This means that 
three root certificates are present, differing in the ECC domain parameters 
used and in the validity period, as follows: 
 
ERCA(1) ERCA(2) ERCA(3) 
BrainpoolP256r1 BrainpoolP384r1 BrainpoolP512r1 
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Note: The Certificate Effective Date (CEfD) of the ERCA(1) is January 1st, 
2017, 00:00:00. The Certificate Effective Date of ERCA(2) starts 17 years 
later. Similarly, the CEfD of the ERCA(3) is 17 years after the ERCA(2) CEfD. 
 
2. The set also contains the two link certificates between these three root keys.  
 
3. For the MSCA and equipment levels, the set is based on the following 
assumptions: 
 MSCAs are free to use either Brainpool or NIST curves. For the Utopia 
MSCA it has been decided to adopt Brainpool curves. On the other hand, 
for the Arcadia MSCA, NIST curves are used. 
 Component personalizers and manufacturers must use either Brainpool or 
NIST, based on the choice made by ‘their’ MSCA. 
 
4. Therefore, under each of the three ERCA certificates in bullet 1, the sample set 
contains: 
 Two key pairs and certificates necessary for a MSCA_VU-EGF in Utopia2. 
These certificates use the Brainpool curve of the length given by the 
relevant ERCA root certificate. These certificates have country code UTO 
(for Utopia). One of these MSCA_VU-EGF certificates has a Certificate 
Effective Date very close to the beginning of the private key usage period 
of the corresponding root certificate. The CEfD of the other MSCA_VU-EGF 
certificate is very close to the end of that key usage period.  
 Two key pairs and certificates necessary for a MSCA_Card in Utopia3, using 
the same Brainpool curve as above. The Certificate Effective Dates of these 
certificates will be distributed in the same way as above. 
 Two key pairs and certificates necessary for a MSCA_VU-EGF in Arcadia4, 
using the NIST curve of the length given by the relevant ERCA root 
certificate. The certificates will have country code ARC. The Certificate 
Effective Dates of these certificates will be distributed in the same way as 
Utopia certificates. 
 Two key pairs and certificates necessary for a MSCA_Card in Arcadia5, also 
using the NIST curve. The Certificate Effective Dates of these certificates 
will be distributed in the same way as Utopia certificates. 
 
UTO 
MSCA_Card(1) 
UTO 
MSCA_Card(2) 
UTO 
MSCA_Card(3) 
BrainpoolP256r1 BrainpoolP384r1 BrainpoolP512r1 
 
                                           
2 The third ERCA generation is an exception; for this generation only one MSCA_VU-EGF certificate is 
generated, close to the beginning of the ERCA private key usage period.   
3 The third ERCA generation is an exception; for this generation only one MSCA_Card certificate is generated, 
close to the beginning of the ERCA private key usage period.   
4 The third ERCA generation is an exception; for this generation only one MSCA_VU-EGF certificate is 
generated, close to the beginning of the ERCA private key usage period.   
5 The third ERCA generation is an exception; for this generation only one MSCA_Card certificate is generated, 
close to the beginning of the ERCA private key usage period.   
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UTO   
MSCA_VU-EGF(1) 
UTO   
MSCA_VU-EGF(2) 
UTO   
MSCA_VU-EGF(3) 
BrainpoolP256r1 BrainpoolP384r1 BrainpoolP512r1 
 
ARC 
MSCA_Card(1) 
ARC 
MSCA_Card(2) 
ARC 
MSCA_Card(3) 
NIST P-256 NIST P-384 NIST P-521 
 
ARC   
MSCA_VU-EGF(1) 
ARC   
MSCA_VU-EGF(2) 
ARC   
MSCA_VU-EGF(3) 
NIST P-256 NIST P-384 NIST P-521 
 
This will allow testing card-VU and EGF-VU interaction for the same type of curve 
and between different types of curve, according to the above-mentioned 
assumptions on the domain parameters used in the components. 
5. Under each MSCA_VU-EGF certificate, the set contains the keys and 
certificates needed by one VU. These are a VU_MA and a VU_Sign key pair 
plus certificate, as described in section 9.1.4 of Appendix 11. The Certificate 
Effective Dates of these certificates is close to the beginning of the usage 
period of the MSCA_VU-EGF private key used to sign it.  
So in total the set contains the VU_MA and VU_Sign certificates for 10 VUs.  
6. Under each MSCA_Card certificate, the sample set contains all keys and 
certificates needed for a complete set of tachograph cards. These are the 
following key pairs and certificates, as described in section 9.1.5 of Appendix 
11: 
 Driver Card_MA  
 Driver Card_Sign  
 Control Card_MA  
 Workshop Card_MA 
 Workshop Card_Sign  
 Company Card_MA 
This means the set contains the keys and certificates for 10 sets of cards. The 
Certificate Effective Dates of these certificates are set close to the beginning of 
the usage period of the MSCA_Card private key.  
 
7. Under each MSCA_VU-EGF certificate, the set contains the keys and 
certificates needed by one External GNSS Facility. This is a EGF_MA key pair 
plus certificate, as described in section 9.1.6 of Appendix 11. The Certificate 
Effective Date of these certificates is close to the beginning of the usage period 
of the MSCA_VU-EGF private key used to sign it. 
So in total the set contains the EGF_MA certificate for 10 EGFs. 
 
8. All of the abovementioned key pairs are valid ECC key pairs according to the 
requirements in Appendix 11.  
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9. All of the abovementioned certificates are valid, ‘happy flow’ certificates. This 
means that they comply with all requirements in Appendix 11 of Annex 1C 
regarding the certificate format.  
3.2 Symmetric keys 
10. The sample set contains three complete sets of ERCA motion sensor-related 
keys, as described in section 9.2.1 of Appendix 11: 
 Motion Sensor Master Key – VU part 
 Motion Sensor Master Key – Workshop part 
 Motion Sensor Master Key 
 Identification Key 
These sets correspond to the first, second and third generation of the ERCA root 
certificate and are featured by a key length of 128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits 
respectively. 
 
11. Next to that, the sample set contains the following data for four Motion 
Sensors (see below for details):   
 One to three Pairing Key(s) (see CSM_117 in Appendix 11); 
 The encryption of the Pairing Key(s) with all valid generations of the Motion 
Sensor Master Key (as described in CSM_116 in Appendix 11); 
 The serial number; 
 The encryption of the serial number with all valid generations of the 
Identification Key (see CSM_116 in Appendix 11). 
 
The ‘production date’ of these four Motions Sensors (MS) is chosen as follows (see 
Figure 4)6: 
 MS_1 is issued at the beginning of the validity period of the ERCA(1) 
certificate. This MS has one Pairing Key of 128 bits long. This Pairing Key is 
additionally present in encrypted form, using the first-generation (128-bits) 
Motion Sensor Master Key. The serial number is present in plaintext form as 
well as encrypted with the 128-bits Motion Sensor Master Key. 
 MS_2 is issued at the beginning of the validity period of the ERCA(2) 
certificate. This MS has two Pairing Keys, one 128 bits, the other 192 bits. 
These Pairing Keys are additionally present in encrypted form, using the first-
generation (128-bits) and second-generation (192-bits) Motion Sensor Master 
Key, respectively. The serial number is present in plaintext form as well as 
encrypted twice, once using both of these Motion Sensor Master Keys. 
 MS_3 issued at the end of the private key usage period of the ERCA(2) 
certificate. This MS has three Pairing Keys, of 128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits 
length. These Pairing Keys are additionally present in encrypted form, using 
the first, second and third generation Motion Sensor Master Key, respectively. 
The serial number is present in plaintext form as well as encrypted thrice, 
once using each of these Motion Sensor Master Keys. 
 MS_4 issued at the beginning of the validity period of the ERCA(3) certificate. 
This MS has two Pairing Keys, one 192 bits, the other 256 bits. These Pairing 
Keys are additionally present in encrypted form, using the second-generation 
(192-bits) and third-generation (256-bits) Motion Sensor Master Key, 
                                           
6 Note that these production dates are not directly mentioned in the cryptographic material. They just influence 
the number of Pairing Keys and encrypted serial numbers stored in the motion sensor. 
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respectively. The serial number is present in plaintext form as well as 
encrypted twice, once using both of these Motion Sensor Master Keys. 
  
 
Figure 4 'Production dates' of Motion Sensors contained in the sample set. Motion Sensor Master Key and 
DSRC Master Key usage periods. 
12. The sample set contains three DSRC Master Keys as described in section 9.2.2 
of Appendix 11, with a length of 128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits respectively, 
for each of the key generations defined in Appendix 11. This is depicted in 
Figure 4. 
 
13. Next to that, for each of the VUs for which the set contains VU_MA and 
VU_Sign key pairs and certificates (see section 3.1), the sample set also 
contains the VU-specific keys K_VUDSRC_ENC and K_VUDSRC_MAC, as specified 
in section 9.2.2 of Appendix 11. For each VU, the correct DSRC Master Key has 
been used (following from the Certificate Effective Date of that VU). As 
diversification data, the serial number of the VU is used, which is equal to the 
CHR in this VU’s MA or Sign certificate. 
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4 Data element values for certificates 
This chapter describes how the values for all fields in all certificates are set in detail. 
Section 4.1 describes the values used for ERCA root certificates and ERCA link 
certificates. 
Section 4.2 describes the values used for MSCA certificates. 
Section 4.3 describes the values used for VU, EGF and card certificates. 
4.1 ERCA (link) certificates 
Field Value 
Certificate Profile Identifier ‘00’ 
Certificate Authority Reference  See for CHR below, except for 
keySerialNumber: for the first link certificate 
the keySerialNumber is ‘01’, for the second link 
certificate it is ‘02’. 
Certificate Holder Authorisation  
 tachographApplicationID 
‘FF 53 4D 52 44 54’ (per Appendix 1) 
 equipmentType 
13 (decimal)   (per Appendix 1) 
Domain Parameters OID of the Brainpool curve with the correct key 
length, see section 2.1 and Appendix 11 
Certificate Holder Reference  
 nationNumeric 
‘FD’   
 nationAlpha  
“EC ”    
 keySerialNumber 
For root certificates: Use ‘01’ for the first 
certificate, ‘02’ for the second certificate, etc.  
For link certificates, Use ‘02’ for the first 
certificate, ‘03’ for the second certificate. 
 additionalInfo 
‘FF FF’  
 caIdentifier 
‘01’ 
Certificate Effective Date (CEfD) January 1st, 2017, 00:00:00 for the first 
certificate; the CEfD of the other generations 
follow then automatically. 
Certificate Expiry Date (CExD) Follows from CEfD and the validity period of the 
certificate type specified in Appendix 11. 
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4.2 MSCA certificates 
Field Value 
Certificate Profile Identifier ‘00’ 
Certificate Authority Reference See for CHR of ERCA above. 
Certificate Holder Authorisation  
 tachographApplicationID 
‘FF 53 4D 52 44 54’ (per Appendix 1) 
 equipmentType 
14 (decimal)   (per Appendix 1) 
Note: there is no difference for MSCA_VU-EGF 
and MSCA_Card certificates. 
Domain Parameters For country UTO: OID of the Brainpool curve 
with the correct key length, see section 2.1 and 
Appendix 11 
For country ARC: OID of the NIST curve with 
the correct key length 
Certificate Holder Reference  
 nationNumeric 
For country UTO: ‘FB  
For country ARC: ‘FC’  
(Values not currently in use) 
 nationAlpha  
“UTO” for Utopia 
“ARC” for Arcadia  
 keySerialNumber 
Per MSCA, use 1 for the first certificate, 2 for 
the second certificate, etc. 
 additionalInfo 
‘FF FF’  
 caIdentifier 
‘01’ 
Certificate Effective Date (CEfD) For both UTO and ARC and for both MSCA_Card 
and MSCA_VU-EGF certificates: 
 For the first certificate (1-1), equal to 
CEfD of the first ERCA certificate. 
 For the second certificate (1-2), equal to 
the end of the private key usage period 
of the first ERCA certificate, minus one 
second.  
 For the third certificate (2-1), equal to 
the CEfD of the second ERCA certificate. 
 Etc. 
Certificate Expiry Date (CExD) Follows from CEfD and the validity period of the 
certificate type specified in Appendix 11.  
Note that this period is different for MSCA_VU-
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EGF and MSCA_Card certificates. 
 
4.3 Equipment certificates 
Field Value 
Certificate Profile Identifier ‘00’ 
Certificate Authority Reference See for CHR of MSCA above. 
Certificate Holder Authorization  
 tachographApplicationID 
‘FF 53 4D 52 44 54’ (per Appendix 1) 
 equipmentType 
Per Appendix 1, all values decimal. 
Driver Card (for MA):  1 
Workshop Card (for MA):  2 
Control Card:    3 
Company Card:   4 
Vehicle Unit (for MA):  6 
External GNSS Facility:  8 
Driver Card (for signing):  17 
Workshop Card (for signing): 18 
Vehicle Unit (for signing):  19 
Domain Parameters For equipment issued under country UTO, OID 
of the Brainpool curve with the correct key 
length, see section 2.1 and Appendix 11. 
For equipment issued under country ARC, OID 
of the NIST curve with the correct key length. 
Certificate Holder Reference  
 serialNumber   
Sequential numbering per type of equipment. 
Note that the same serialNumber is used for 
the Signing and MA certificate of the same 
piece of equipment. 
 monthYear  
Consistent with Certificate Effective Date 
 type 
Per Appendix 1, all values decimal. 
Driver Card     1 
Workshop Card    2 
Control Card:    3 
Company Card:   4 
Vehicle Unit     6 
External GNSS Facility:  8 
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Note that for signing certificates, this value is 
different from equipmentType in the Certificate 
Holder Authorization.  
 manufacturerCode  
‘FF’ (Value not currently used) 
Certificate Effective Date (CEfD) Equal to CEfD of signing MSCA certificate. 
Certificate Expiry Date (CExD) Follows from CEfD and the validity period of the 
certificate type specified in Appendix 11. 
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5 Key and certificate file formats 
5.1 Asymmetric keys and certificates 
14. Asymmetric private keys are present in the sample set in plaintext PKCS #8 
format, according to RFC 5958 [5] and related. This format is explained in 
more detail in Appendix 2. 
 
15. Public key certificates are present in the set in the plaintext format specified in 
Appendix 11.  
5.2 Symmetric keys 
16. The sample set contains all symmetric keys in plaintext format.  
5.3 File names 
17. Each private key, each certificate and each symmetric key is stored in a 
separate file. Key identification (type, validity period) is done by means of the 
file name for each key file. The naming convention is the same as the 
convention described in section 3, except that a prefix is added where 
appropriate for MSCA and equipment certificates to indicate the country (ARC 
or UTO). Note that keys and certificates are located in folders that help clarify 
their meaning. 
Examples 
Some example file names for asymmetric keys and certificates, which are located in 
the folder ‘ECC keys and certificates’ are given below: 
Folder: ...\ERCA\ 
 ERCA (1).pkcs8 contains the private key of the first the ERCA root key pair. As 
explained above, this private key uses the Brainpool256r1 standardized domain 
parameters.  
 ERCA (2).cert contains the certificate of the second root key pair. This certificate 
uses the Brainpool384r1 domain parameters. 
Folder: …\ERCA\MSCA\ARC\ 
 ARC_MSCA_VU-EGF (1-1).cert contains the first MSCA_VU-EGF certificate issued 
under ERCA(1). This certificate uses the NIST P-256 domain parameters because 
the country is Arcadia. As explained above, this certificate is issued very close to 
the beginning of the private key usage period of the ERCA(1) root key pair. 
Folder: …\ ERCA\MSCA\ARC\Equipment\TC\ 
 ARC_Workshop Card_Sign (2-2).cert contains the second Workshop Card_Sign 
certificate issued under ERCA(2). This certificate is issued very close to the end of 
the private key usage period of the ERCA(2) certificate. This certificate uses the 
NIST P-384 domain parameters. 
 
Some example file names for asymmetric keys and certificates, which are located in 
the folder ‘AES keys’ are given below: 
Folder: …\DSRC keys\ERCA-MSCA\ 
 DSRCMK-1.bin contains the first-generation DSRC Master Key. This key has a 
length of 128 bits. 
Folder …\DSRC keys\ERCA-MSCA\UTO\Equipment\ 
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 UTO_VU (1-1)_DSRCK_ENC.bin contains the K_VUDSRC_ENC belonging to the 
VU(1-1) for Utopia. This key has been derived from DSRCMK-1 by diversifying 
with the serial number of this VU, which is equal to the CHR in this VU’s MA or 
Sign certificate. (This certificate can be found in the folder …\ECC keys and 
certificates\ERCA\MSCA\UTO\Equipment\VU\) 
Folder …\Motion sensor keys and encrypted data\ERCA-MSCA\ 
 MSMK-3.bin contains the third-generation Motion Sensor Master Key, which has a 
length of 256 bits. This key has been created by XOR-ing the key in MSMK-3-
VU.bin and the one in MSMK-3-WS.bin. The Identification Key that is derived from 
this Motion Sensor Master Key can be found in the file MSIK-3.bin. 
Folder …\Motion sensor keys and encrypted data\ERCA-MSCA\Equipment\ 
 MS-2-PK-1.bin contains the first-generation Pairing Key for motions sensor MS-2. 
This is a 128-bits keys allowing the motion sensor to be paired with a first-
generation VU. Similarly, MS-2-PK-2 is the second-generation Pairing Key for this 
motion sensor. 
 MS-2-PK-ENC-2.bin contains the encryption of this second-generation Pairing Key 
with the second-generation Motion Sensor Master Key (which itself can be found 
in the file MSMK-2.bin.) 
 MS-2-SN.bin contains the serial number of this motion sensor. 
 MS-2-SN-ENC-1.bin contains the encryption of this serial number with the first-
generation Identification Key. Similarly, MS-2-SN-ENC-2.bin contains the 
encryption of the same serial number with the second-generation Identification 
Key.  
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6 Testing possibilities 
6.1 Testing possibilities with the sample set 
These certificates and the associated key pairs allow extensive testing of the security 
mechanisms specified in Appendix 11: 
 Testing the correctness of the implementation of the AES, SHA-2 and ECC 
algorithms, using all specified key lengths and standardized domain parameters. 
 Verification of a card certificate chain by a VU, including the possible use of a link 
certificate and the verification of the temporal validity of all certificates in the 
chain.  
 Verification of a VU certificate chain by a tachograph card, including the possible 
use of a link certificate and the verification of the temporal validity of all 
certificates in the chain.  
 The VU authentication mechanism, described in section 10.3 of Appendix 11. 
 Chip Authentication and Session Key Agreement according to section 10.4 of 
Appendix 11. 
 The Secure Messaging protocol between a VU and a card. 
 The VU and EGF coupling mechanism. 
 VU and EGF normal operation, including the use of Secure Messaging. 
 Signing of downloaded data by a VU, including doing so in the first three months 
after the normal 15-year life period of the VU. See also CSM_78 and CSM_91 in 
Appendix 11. 
 Signing of downloaded data by a driver card or workshop card, including doing so 
in the first month after the normal life period of the card. See also CSM_89 in 
Appendix 11. 
 
In addition, the symmetric key material in the sample set allows testing of 
 The interaction between a VU and a motion sensor (with the support of a 
workshop card) during pairing and their secure communication, as specified in 
chapter 12 of the Appendix 11, including the use of different key generations. 
 The correct protection of the remote early detection communication link. This is 
described in chapter 13 of Appendix 11. 
 
Please note that this list is informative only. 
6.2 Other tests 
There are a few situations that cannot be tested with the current sample set. Examples 
include: 
 Using link certificates where the ‘old’ cipher suite has the same strength as the 
new one, or where the link certificate moves directly from the weakest to the 
strongest suite. 
 Using a VU issued for instance under ERCA generation 2 and letting it interact with 
a card issued under ERCA(1), in case the VU is in fact issued earlier than the card. 
(So the VU, which uses 384-bits security, is actually older than the card, which 
uses 256-bits security.) This situation will occur towards the end of the private 
key usage period of the last MSCA key pairs issued under ERCA(1). Because this 
is somewhat unusual intuitively, badly implemented cards or VUs may not handle 
this situation correctly. 
 The possible update of the card’s current time as described in CSM_167.  In 
theory it would be possible to test this with the provided set, e.g. by inserting a 
Card (1-2) in a VU (2-1). The card’s current time should then be updated from 
31-12-2033 23:59:59 to 01-01-2034 00:00:00. However, the problem may be 
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how to check that this update occurred. Maybe other certificates should be 
designed with validity dates suitable to test this behaviour. 
 
Other tests may be envisioned as well. While such tests cannot be executed using the 
provided sample set, stakeholders may still carry out such tests if they choose to 
generate additional sample certificates and key pairs.  
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Appendix 1 Cryptographic elements per component 
This Appendix describes all of the asymmetric keys, certificates and symmetric keys that 
are contained in each instance of the four main components of the Smart Tachograph 
system at issuance. 
Appendix 1.1 Cryptographic elements installed in a Vehicle Unit 
Asymmetric keys and certificates 
Description Purpose Type Source 
VU private key and 
public key certificate 
for Mutual 
Authentication 
Used by the VU to perform 
VU authentication towards 
tachograph cards and 
external GNSS facilities  
ECC Private key generated by VU 
or VU manufacturer. 
Certificate created and 
signed by MSCA  
VU private key and 
public key certificate 
for signing 
Used by the VU to sign 
downloaded data files  
ECC Private key generated by VU 
or VU manufacturer. 
Certificate created and 
signed by MSCA 
ERCA root public 
key(s) and 
certificate(s)7 
Used by the VU for the 
verification of MSCA 
certificates issued under 
the corresponding ERCA 
root certificate. 
ECC Generated by ERCA; 
inserted in VU by 
manufacturer at the end of 
the manufacturing phase or 
obtained from card or EGF 
during lifetime 
Certificate of MSCA 
responsible for signing 
the VU_MA and 
VU_Sign certificates 
Used by a card, EGF or 
dedicated equipment to 
obtain and verify the 
MSCA_VU-EGF public key 
they will subsequently use 
to verify the VU_MA or 
VU_Sign certificate 
 Created and signed by ERCA 
based on MSCA input; 
inserted by manufacturer at 
the end of the 
manufacturing phase 
Table 4: Overview of VU asymmetric keys and certificates 
 
Symmetric keys 
Description Purpose Type Source 
Motion Sensor Master 
Key – VU part 
Allowing a VU to derive the 
Motion Sensor Master Key 
if a workshop card is 
inserted into the VU. 
AES Generated by ERCA; 
inserted by VU 
manufacturer at the end of 
the manufacturing phase. 
VU-specific DSRC keys 
for authenticity and 
confidentiality 
Two separate keys used to 
ensure the authenticity 
confidentiality of data sent 
over a DSRC link between 
a RCF and a REDCR 
AES Derived by MSCA based on 
DSRC Master Key and VU 
serial number; inserted by 
VU manufacturer at the end 
of the manufacturing phase 
Table 5: Overview of VU symmetric keys 
                                           
7
 Note: Because of the regular replacement of the ERCA root key a VU may contain more than one ERCA 
certificates and Link certificates. 
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Appendix 1.2 Cryptographic elements installed in a Motion Sensor 
Asymmetric keys and certificates 
A motion sensor does not contain any asymmetric keys or certificates. 
 
Symmetric keys 
Description Purpose Type Source 
Motion sensor pairing 
key 
Used by a VU for 
encrypting the motion 
sensor session key when 
sending it to the motion 
sensor during pairing. 
AES Generated by the motion 
sensor manufacturer; stored 
in motion sensor at the end 
of the manufacturing phase 
Table 6: Overview of Motion Sensor symmetric keys 
Apart from this key, a motion sensor contains the value of the pairing key encrypted 
under the motion sensor master key. It also contains the value of its serial number 
encrypted under the identification key8. 
Appendix 1.3 Cryptographic elements installed in a Tachograph 
Card 
Asymmetric keys and certificates 
Description Purpose Type Source 
Card private key and 
public key certificate 
for Mutual 
Authentication and 
session key agreement 
Used by the card to 
perform card 
authentication towards 
VUs and perform session 
key agreement 
ECC Generated by card or card 
manufacturer/personaliser 
at the end of the 
manufacturing phase 
Card private key and 
public key certificate 
for signing  
 
Used by the card to sign 
downloaded data files.  
ECC Generated by card or card 
manufacturer/personaliser 
at the end of the 
manufacturing phase.  
Driver cards and workshop 
cards only 
Certificate of MSCA 
responsible for signing 
the Card_MA and/or 
Card_Sign certificates 
Used by a VU or dedicated 
equipment to obtain and 
verify the MSCA_Card 
public key they will 
subsequently use to verify 
the Card_MA or Card_Sign 
certificate 
ECC Created and signed by ERCA 
based on MSCA input; 
inserted by manufacturer at 
the end of the 
manufacturing phase 
ERCA root public 
key(s) and 
certificate(s) 
Used by the card for the 
verification of MSCA 
certificates issued under 
the corresponding ERCA 
root certificate.  
ECC Generated by ERCA; 
inserted in card by 
manufacturer at the end of 
the manufacturing phase or 
obtained from VU during 
lifetime 
Table 7: Overview of TC asymmetric keys and certificates 
                                           
8 Note: Because the motion sensor master key and all associated keys are regularly replaced, up to three 
different encryptions of the pairing key and the serial number (based on consecutive generations of the 
motion sensor master key) may be present in a motion sensor. 
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Symmetric keys 
Description Purpose Type Source 
Motion sensor master 
key – workshop card 
part9 
Allowing a VU to derive the 
Motion Sensor Master Key 
if a workshop card is 
inserted into the VU 
AES Generated by ERCA; 
inserted in card by card 
manufacturer 
Workshop cards only 
DSRC Master Key10 Master key to derive keys 
to protect confidentiality 
and authenticity of data 
sent from a VU to a control 
authority over a DSRC 
channel 
AES Generated by ERCA; 
inserted in card by card 
manufacturer 
Control and workshop cards 
only 
Table 8: Overview of TC symmetric keys 
Appendix 1.4 Cryptographic elements installed in an EGF 
Asymmetric keys and certificates 
Description Purpose Type Source 
EGF private key and 
public key certificate 
for Mutual 
Authentication 
Used by the EGF to 
perform EGF 
authentication towards 
VUs 
ECC Private key generated by 
EGF or EGF manufacturer at 
the end of the 
manufacturing phase 
Certificate created and 
signed by MSCA 
Certificate of MSCA 
responsible for signing 
the EGF_MA certificate 
Used by a VU to obtain and 
verify the MSCA_VU-EGF 
public key it will 
subsequently use to verify 
the EGF_MA certificate 
ECC Created and signed by ERCA 
based on MSCA input; 
inserted by manufacturer at 
the end of the 
manufacturing phase 
ERCA root public 
key(s) and 
certificate(s) 
Used by the EGF for the 
verification of MSCA 
certificates issued under 
the corresponding ERCA 
root certificate.  
ECC Generated by ERCA; 
inserted in EGF by 
manufacturer at the end of 
the manufacturing phase or 
obtained from VU during 
lifetime 
Table 9: Overview of EGF asymmetric keys and certificates 
Symmetric keys 
At issuance, an EGF does not contain any symmetric keys. 
                                           
9 Note: Because of the regular replacement of the ERCA root key and all associated keys, a workshop card may 
in fact contain up to three of these keys. 
10 Note: Because of the regular replacement of the ERCA root key and all associated keys, a control or 
workshop card may in fact contain up to three of these keys 
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Appendix 2 Format of .pkcs8 files 
Format of .pkcs8 files in the sample set, according to RFC 5958 [5]. All values hexadecimal. 
30 L SEQUENCE SIZE (1) OF OneAsymmetricKey; see RFC 5958 [5]. Both of the optional elements 
attributes and publicKey in this data type are omitted 
  02 01 00 Version; the value is set to ‘00’ to indicate that the format of OneAssymmetricKey is equal to that of 
PrivateKeyInfo as specified in RFC 5280 
  30 L PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier 
    06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 
02 01 
PUBLIC-KEY: Algorithm identifier for elliptic curve is given in RFC 5912 [6] 
    06 L V PrivateKeyAlgorithms: see data type ECParameters in RFC 5912 [6]. The CHOICE made here is to use a 
namedCurve; the value is the DER-encoded OID of the relevant curve. 
  04 L OCTET STRING containing private key; see RFC 5958 [5]  
    30 L ECPrivateKey; see RFC 5915 [7]. Both of the optional elements parameters and publicKey in 
this data type are present. 
      02 01 01 version; the value represents ecPrivkeyVer1. 
      04 L V OCTET STRING containing the value of the private key 
      A0 L  parameters 
        06 L V ECParameters; the CHOICE made here is to use a namedCurve; the value is 
the DER-encoded OID of the relevant curve. 
      A1 L publicKey 
        03 L V BITSTRING containing the value of the public key. Note that the first byte 
‘00’ indicates zero empty bits, as per the definition of the ASN.1 BITSTRING 
data type. The second byte ‘04’ indicates the uncompressed encoding, as 
per TR 03111 [8] 
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